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A monopolist supplies a homogenous good to two geographically separated markets. Production
costs and demand conditions are diﬀerent in each market. A line with a limited transport capacity
connects both markets.
The paper compares two institutional frameworks: (1) exclusive access to the line is granted to
the monopolist (2) access to the line is auctioned to the monopolist and consumers. It derives the
monopolist￿s strategy, and illustrates the result with examples.
In general, it is not clear-cut which regime gives the highest total surplus. For linear demand
functions exclusive access is superior to auctioning, if transport capacity is small, cost diﬀerences
are large and demand conditions similar.
JEL: D42, L12, L42, L9, R41
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper considers a monopolist who supplies a homogenous product to two geographically separated
markets. Production costs and demand conditions are diﬀerent in each market. A line with a limited
transport capacity connects both markets. Two regimes for the use of the line are considered.
In a ￿rst regime, the monopolist owns the transmission line. The monopolist price discriminates,
charging a diﬀerent price in each region. This regime is called integration in the remainder of the text.
In a second regime, transport capacity is auctioned. The monopolist and the consumers can buy
part or all the capacity. Price discrimination is still possible, but costly for the monopolist, as consumers
arbitrate on the price diﬀerence. This is called unbundling.
The monopolist￿s strategy is derived under both regimes. Numerical examples are used to clarify the
results. Shifting from integration to unbundling decreases regional price diﬀerences: the price increases
in the low priced region, and decreases in the high priced region. Consumers in the high priced region
∗I would like to thank Stef Proost, Ben Hobbs, Guido Pepermans, Edward Calthrop, Bruno De Borger, Patrick Van
Cayseele and Frank Verboven.
1are better of under unbundling, and consumers in the low priced region are worse of. The monopolist
prefers integration instead of unbundling. The eﬀect on total surplus is ambiguous.
As a special case, the paper considers linear demand functions. Total surplus is compared under
both regimes. It is shown that for small transmission capacities the results depend on the similarity of
cost and demand functions in the two regions. If costs are diﬀerent and demand similar, integration is
better. If cost are similar and demand diﬀerent, unbundling is better. For large transmission capacities,
unbundling is always better.
The last part of the paper shows that there are two reasons why a monopolist would withhold
transmission capacity, i.e. buying transmission capacity and not using it. First, it makes it possible
to set a high price in the importing region without de-congestioning the transmission line. Second, it
makes it cheaper to congest a line in the opposite direction of cost diﬀerences, i.e. congestion from the
cheap region to the expensive region.
The paper extends the models on third degree price discrimination of for instance Varian (1985) and
Tirole (1988). They assume no restriction on transmission capacity, which simpli￿es the model in two
ways: (1) Under unbundling, arbitrage cancels regional price diﬀerences, and leads to a uniform price in
both regions. (2) Goods are only produced in the low cost country, as it costs nothing to export them
from the low to the high cost region.
With limited transmission capacity this is no longer true: unbundling does not eliminate price dis-
crimination and cost diﬀerences do matter.
The model in this paper is especially relevant to study congestion in electricity markets. The existing
transmission lines that interconnect countries, were designed to transport only emergency power during a
contingency. With liberalization, interconnectors are also used to arbitrate on regional price diﬀerences.
As a result some of the lines are highly congested.
There are two approaches to study the eﬀect of congestion in electricity markets. One uses game
theory to study a small network and solves algebraically for a Nash equilibrium. That is the approach
followed here. Other authors followed the same approach but used a diﬀerent set-up. Joskow and Tirole
(2000) study a monopolist which has generation capacity in one region, whereas I assume production
capacity in two regions. Borenstein et al. (1998) discuss a Cournot generation duopoly in a network
with two regions. They put a generator in each region and show that insuﬃcient transmission capacity
decreases competition. Both models look only at one allocation mechanism: unbundling, and do not
compare it with integration.
Another approach uses a simpler equilibrium concept than Nash and solve it numerically. Day et al.
(2002) build oligopoly models with conjectured supply functions, both under integration and unbundling.
They assume that generators are price takers in the transmission market, which allows them to use the
Generalized Nash as de￿ned by Harker (1991). See also Willems (2002).
Both approaches are combined by Hobbs et al. (2000). They use the standard Nash Equilibrium for
a network of thirty nodes, which is solved numerically. For each player a mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints is solved with a penalty interior point algorithm.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 describes the model and solves for the welfare optimum. Sections 3
2and 4 look at integration and unbundling. Both regimes are compared in the ￿fth section. Section 6
discusses some policy implications.
2M o d e l
2.1 Set up
Two regions (i ∈ {1,2}) are connected with a transmission line with a capacity k.I ne a c hr e g i o nt h e r e
are price-taking consumers, and generation plants. Consumers in region i are represented by a downward




hi(t)dt + pihi(p) (1)
with ﬂ pi the reservation price in region i :
ﬂ pi ≡ h
−1
i (0) (2)
The monopolist produces Qi units of electricity in region i at constant marginal costs. The marginal
production cost cH in region 1 is larger than the cost cL in region 2 (cH − cL = ∆c>0). Total
production cost is cHQ1 + cLQ2. The innocuous assumption is made that the high production cost is
lower than the reservation prices, ﬂ pi >c H.
The network transports x units of electricity from region 2 to region 1. There are no transmission
costs. A negative x denotes transport from region 1 to region 2. In each region, generation, consumption
and import (or export) over the transmission line are balanced.
h2(p2)+x = Q2 (3)
h1(p1) − x = Q1 (4)
The total production cost is:
C(p1,p 2,x)=h1(p1)cH + h2(p2)cL − x∆c (5)
When x is positive, expensive production is replaced with cheap production.
Welfare is the sum of gross consumers surplus minus the production cost:
W(p1,p 2,x)=GCS1(p1)+GCS2(p2) − C(p1,p 2,x) (6)
2.2 Social optimum
The social optimum maximizes welfare W subject to three types of constraints. Consumption and gen-
eration should be positive (hi(pi) ≥ 0 and Qi ≥ 0 ). Positive generation implies that local consumption
1Because the demand for electricity is rather inelastic, a monopoly model predicts large prices for electricity. By
assuming that there are competitive fringe generators in both regions, the monopolist faces a more elastic demand. Such
competitive fringe generators are easily included in the model. Assume competitive fringe generators with marginal cost
function c
f
i (qi), and consumers with demand function q = hc






























Case A Case B Case C
Demand function
Opportunity cost
Figure 1: Equilibrium in market 1, for three diﬀerent capacities of the transmission line.
is larger than import. This follows directly from equation 3 and 4. The generation and consumption
constraints are
max{x,0} ≤ h1(p1) (7)
max{−x,0} ≤ h2(p2) (8)
The transmission constraints are :
−k ≤ x ≤ k (9)
The paper does not assume an upper limit the production level of the generators.
The opportunity cost for electricity in region 2 is always cL. Therefore, the socially optimal price is
p2 = cL (10)
In the social optimum electricity is transported from the region with cheap production to the region with
expensive production, with other words x ≥ 0. Figure 1 presents the market equilibrium in region 1 for
three transmission capacities. The full line is the demand function and the dotted line is the marginal
opportunity cost given the import from the cheap region. The equilibrium marginal opportunity cost
for electricity in region 1 depends upon the transmission capacity. For small capacities it is cH (case C),
for high capacities it is cL (case A), and for intermediate capacities it is somewhere in between (case
B). The socially optimal price in region 1, p1,i s
p1 =

   
   
cL if pk
1 <c L Case A
pk
1 if cL ≤ pk
1 ≤ cH Case B






i (k). It is the price at which demand is equal to k.
2.3 Rewriting the welfare function
For further reference, it is useful to rewrite welfare as a function of total production h = h1(p1)+h2(p2),
the regional price diﬀerence τ = p1 −p2, and the quantity x transported: W∗(h,τ,x). Using the inverse
4function theorem the marginal eﬀects of these variables can be written out as: (see appendix C) 2
∂W∗
∂h
=( p1 − cH)σ1 +( p2 − cL)σ2 (12)
∂W∗
∂τ









2(p2) and ρ = −(h0
1(p1)−1 + h0
2(p2)−1)−1.
They express the marginal welfare eﬀect of a variable, keeping the two other variables ￿xed. The
logic behind the equations is as follows.
The ￿rst equation shows the marginal welfare eﬀect of increasing total consumption h. σi is the
marginal change of consumption in region i when total output increases, while keeping the price diﬀerence




ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
τ,x
(15)
The welfare eﬀect of an consumption increase in region 1 is equal to (p1 − cH), because it has to be
produced locally, given that the transport x is not changed. The marginal welfare eﬀect is decreasing
with total production quantity, i.e. ∂W ∗
∂h (h) is downward sloping.
The second equation shows that when total production is kept ￿xed, the marginal eﬀect of the price
diﬀerence is proportional to ∆c−τ, keeping production quantity and transport of electricity ￿xed. Also
the marginal eﬀect of the price diﬀerence ∂W ∗
∂τ (τ) is downward sloping. In the optimum, consumption
should be allocated among the two regions such that the price diﬀerence is equal to the cost diﬀerence.









ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h,x
(16)
which is an averaged slope of the two demand functions. For a constant level of consumption, it is a
measure of how much demands shifts from region 1 to region 2 if the price diﬀerence between the regions
increases.
The last expression shows that if extra electricity is transported from the low cost region to the high
cost region, welfare increases with ∆c.T h i se ﬀect is always positive.
If no electricity is produced in region 1, x = h1(p1), x can be eliminated from the welfare function.
Welfare ￿ W∗(h,τ) is a function the total production h and the regional price diﬀerence τ.T h e￿rst order
derivatives are given by:
∂ ￿ W∗
∂h




These two equations show that the opportunity cost for electricity is equal to cL in both regions and
that the marginal eﬀect the price diﬀerence is proportional to the price diﬀerence τ.
2Note that these expressions do not take into account transmission, generation or consumption constraints.
53I n t e g r a t i o n
Electricity generation and network operation are integrated in a single ￿rm. (Integration = index I).
The ￿rm owns all transmission capacity and sets electricity prices3.H i sp r o ￿ti se q u a lt or e v e n u em i n u s
production costs
πI = p1h1(p1)+p2h2(p2) − C(p1,p 2,x) (19)
De￿ne πi(p,c) as the pro￿t of a generator who sells electricity in market i at a price p,and has production
cost c.
πi(p,c)=( p − c) hi(p) (20)
Marginal pro￿t
∂πi(p,c)





∂p2 < 0 (21)
The pro￿t of the monopolist is the sum of three terms:
πI = π1(p1,c H)+π2(p2,c L)+x • ∆c (22)
The ￿rst two terms are the pro￿ts in region 1 and 2 when all electricity is produced locally. The
third term is the pro￿t increase, when expensive production is replaced by cheap production. The
monopolist maximizes his pro￿t subject to the generation and consumption constraints (7 and 8) and
the transmission constraint (9).
Except for the objective function the problem of the integrated monopolist and the social planner
are equal. The optimal solution for the monopolist is the intersection of the marginal revenue function
and the opportunity cost of electricity.
De￿ne pm
ij as the local monopoly price in region i when the production cost is cj.
pm
ij ≡ argmax
p πi(p,cj) i =1 ,2 and j = L,H (23)













hi(pi) the demand elasticity in region i.
3As in most models on price discrimination, it is assumed that the monopolist sets prices. This is of course equivalent
with setting production quantities. Though, both approaches give diﬀerent conditions for the objective to be concave, and
the constraints to be convex.
4The objective function in prices is concave when
∂2πi(p,c)
∂p2 = h00
1(p)(p − cH)+2 h0
1(p) < 0. In general, this function
does not need to be concave when p becomes smaller than the costs. (p<c H). If the monopolist has only one production
plant this means that he is selling at a loss, what he of course will never do. In our problem the monopolist can set a price
in region 1 below the marginal costs in region 1 without making a loss, as he can import electricity from low cost region2.
Ap r i c eb e l o wm a r g i n a lc o s tc a nn o tb er u l e do u t .I nt h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri ti sa s s u m e dt h a ti nt h er e l e v a n tp r i c er a n g e
the objective function is concave.






























Figure 2: Marginal revenue and marginal opportunity cost of electricity in region 1.





The opportunity cost of electricity in region 1, and hence the optimal price pI
1, depends upon the
size of the transmission line. Figure 2 presents the marginal opportunity cost and marginal revenue of
selling electricity in region 1. Their intersection is the optimal value.
If k is small, the opportunity cost is cH. (Case C) The optimal price is pm
1H. For high transmission
capacity, the opportunity costs is cL,and the optimal price is pm
1L. (Case A) For intermediate capacities




   















The price in the high cost country can be higher or lower than in the low cost country. This depends
on the shape of the demand functions and the cost diﬀerence. The generator takes a higher markup in
the region where demand is less elastic. If demand in the high cost region is more elastic than in the
low cost region, the price can be lower in the high cost region. In other words, the electricity price in a
region can be high because it is expensive to generate electricity or because the monopolist sets a high
markup.
As a special case, suppose that the two regions have the same demand for electricity: h1(•)=h2(•)=
￿ h(•) De￿ne the local monopoly price pM(c) = argmaxp ￿ h(p)(p − c). For a concave demand function,
the monopolist shifts a change in costs through to his consumers, but not completely: 0 <
∂pM
∂c < 1.
5The assumption that ﬂ pi >c H implies directly that the zero consumption constraint in region 2 is not binding.
7 Example  1  Example 2 
  Region 1  Region 2  Region 1  Region 2 
32 2
1[￿ ] aM W h
−   -2.6401 -3.333 -3.333 -1.032 
21
2[￿ ] aM W h
−   -16.306 -33.333  0 -29.365 
3[] aM W  13 000  14 000  12 000  11 000 
1 [￿ ] cM W
−   40 15 35 25 
Table 1: Parameters of the two problems.
As a result, the high cost region has the highest price, but the price diﬀerence is smaller than the cost
diﬀerence :
0 < pM(cH) − pM(cL) < ∆c. (26)
3.1 Numerical illustration
Throughout the paper, two numerical examples will be used to clarify the results. Demand function
in region i is represented by a polynome of second order: hi(p) = ai
1p2 + ai
2p + ai
3. Table 1 gives the
coeﬃcients ai
j and production costs of both examples. Figure 3 and 4 show the prices that are set by
the monopolist.






















Figure 3: Example 1: optimal prices in both regions under integration.
Example 1 (Figure 3)
The monopolist sets a constant price pI
2 = 40 EUR/MWh in region 2. The price does not depend on
the transmission capacity because the opportunity cost in region 2 is always cL = 15 EUR/MWh. In
region 1 the price drops from 56 EUR/MWh to 46 EUR/MWh. This happens because the opportunity
cost of electricity drops from cH = 40 EUR/MWh to cL = 15 EUR/MWh.
8For zero transmission capacity the price diﬀerence between the regions is τ =1 6EUR/MWh this
is smaller than the cost diﬀerence ∆c =2 5EUR/MWh. The monopolist takes thus a lower margin in
region 1 (56−40 = 16 EUR/MWh)t h a ni nr e g i o n2( 4 0−15 = 25 EUR/MWh). For large transmission
capacities, the relevant cost diﬀerence is ∆c =0EUR/MWh while the price diﬀerence decreases to
τ =6EUR/MWh. The markup in region 1 (46−15 = 31 EUR/MWh) is now larger than the markup
in region 2 (40 − 15 = 25 EUR/MWh).























Figure 4: Example 2: optimal prices in both regions under integration.
Example 2 (Figure 4)
The monopolist sets a constant price pI
2 =6 1EUR/MWh in region 2. The price does not depend
on the transmission capacity because the opportunity cost in region 2 is always cL =2 5EUR/MWh.
The monopolist takes a mark-up of 36 EUR/MWh.I n r e g i o n 1 the prices drops from 48 EUR/MWh
to 44 EUR/MWh when transmission capacity increases. This happens because the opportunity cost
of electricity drops from cH =3 5EUR/MWh to 25 EUR/MWh.T h e m a r k - u p i n r e g i o n 1 is 13
EUR/MWh for low transmission capacities and 19 EUR/MWh for high capacities. The monopolist
sets a higher mark-up in region 2 than in region 1. For zero transmission capacity the price diﬀerence
between the regions is τ = −12 EUR/MWh. The low cost region 2 has a higher price than the low cost
region, as the diﬀerence in mark-ups outweighs the cost diﬀerences.
Example 2 shows that when the transmission capacity is increased, the price diﬀerence between the
regions might increase. This is more likely when demand in the high cost region (region 1) is more elastic
then demand in the low cost region 2, and when cost diﬀerences are small.
4 Unbundling
The provision of electricity implies two activities: generation and transmission. In the decentralized





Figure 5: Supply function of transmission capacity.
unbundling (index U). In each region there is an energy market, and for transmission, there is a market
for transmission rights. The transmission rights are sold to consumers and to the monopolist.
Joskow and Tirole (2000) explicitly model the microstructure of the transmission rights market.6
Here, a simpler approach is used. It is assumed that consumers arbitrate perfectly on the regional
price diﬀerence. In equilibrium, the transmission price τ equals the price diﬀerence between the regions
(arbitrage condition)7
τ = p1 − p2 (27)
The total number of transmission rights sold for transport of electricity from region 2 to region 1 is
x.8 The rights are directed, i.e. a negative x indicates a transport in the opposite direction. If you buy
a transmission right, you have the right and the obligation to use the transmission line. Buying capacity
and withholding it from the market is not allowed. In section 6.4 this assumption will be relaxed.
The equilibrium in the transmission market is summarized as: (transmission market equilibrium)
τ =0⇒− k ≤ x ≤ k (28)
τ > 0 ⇒ x = k (29)
τ < 0 ⇒ x = −k (30)
The equations de￿ne the short run competitive supply function of transmission capacity τ(x).S e e
￿gure 5. As long as demand for transmission is smaller than supply, its price is zero. When all
transmission capacity is used, the transmission price can diﬀer from zero.
The monopolist sets three variables: p1 and p2, the price for electricity in regions 1 and 2;a n dxG,
the number of transmission rights that he buys. Given these variables the consumers buy xC = x − xG
transmission rights such that there is an equilibrium in the transmission market and that the arbitrage
condition is satis￿ed.
6They consider one or several auctioneers who sell these rights. Because in their model, the generators have an increasing
marginal valuation of transmission rights, the auctioneers have the incentive to wait for selling their rights. They try to
Free Ride on other players who sell their rights.
7If consumers do not participate in the transmission market there is no arbitrage. In this case, auctioning of transmission
rights gives the same result as integration. A possible reason for the lack of arbitrage, is that arbitrageurs can not enter
the market, or that consumers can not resell their electricity.
8This is a slight abuse of notation. Before, τ and x were merely the price diﬀerence and the quantity transported.
Now, they are the price of transmission rights, and the number that is sold to consumers and generators.
10The monopolist￿s pro￿t equals revenue minus production and transmission costs.
π = Revenue − Production Cost − Transmission Cost (31)
In region 1, consumers consume h1(p1) units of electricity. As they import xC units of electricity
from region 2, they buy locally h1(p1)−xC. The monopolist￿s revenue in region 1 is (h1(p1)−xC)p1.T h e
monopolist himself imports an amount xG.I nr e g i o n1,h ep r o d u c e sh1(p1)−xC −xG, and his production
cost is (h1(p1) − xC −xG).cL. A similar reasoning is made for region 2. Revenue and production cost
are (h2(p2)+xC)p2 and (h2(p2)+xC + xG)cL. The transmission cost is equal to xG τ.
The objective function of the monopolist is:
π =[ p1 • (h1(p1) − xC)+p2 • (h2(p2)+xC)] (32)
− [cH • (h1(p1) − xC − xG)+cL • (h2(p2)+xC + xG)] − xG • τ
Lemma 1 If there is perfect arbitrage, the monopolist does not care who buys the transmission rights.
Only the total amount of rights sold, x, matters to him.
The proof is straightforward: substitute the arbitrage condition τ = p1−p2 in the objective function
32 and recollect the diﬀerent terms. The objective function rewrites as:
max
p1,p2,x,τ π1(p1,c H)+π2(p2,c L)+x • ∆c − x • τ
which does only depend on x, and not on xC or xG, separately.
The ￿rst three terms of the objective function are the same as in the previous model. The fourth
term is new and can be interpreted in two ways. First, if the monopolist buys all transmission rights
(xC =0 , xG = x), it is the cost of buying the rights: xG τ. Second, if the consumers buy all transmission
rights (xC = x, xG =0 ), it is the revenue forgone to consumers who do not buy their electricity locally,
b u ti m p o r ti tf r o mt h el o wp r i c e dr e g i o n :xCp1 − xCp2.
The monopolist maximizes his objective function subject to the generation and consumption con-
straints (7 and 8), the arbitrage condition (27) and, the transmission market equilibrium (28-30).9
This is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC, See Luo et al., 1996). It is
hard to solve as the conditions for transmission market equilibrium are highly non-convex.




(p1,p 2,x) ∈ S(p1,p 2) (34)
9Adding the consumption constraint to the problem of the monopolist is not completely correct. The monopolist can





hi(pi) pi ≤ ﬂ pi
0 pi > ﬂ pi
. As it is not optimal for the monopolist to do so, this option is neglected.
11with S(p1,p 2) the feasible set of prices and transmission. This problem is not trivial because the feasible
set S is discontinuous in prices.
S =

   
   
S> if τ > 0 price region I
S= if τ =0 price region II





   
   
(p1,p 2,x)





   




   
   
(p1,p 2,x)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h1(p1) ≥ max{x,0}
h2(p2) ≥ max{−x,0}
−k ≤ x ≤ k

   




   
   
(p1,p 2,x)





   
   
(38)
4.1 Maximizing the monopolist￿s pro￿t
In order to solve the problem of the monopolist three simpler problems are solved: Pro￿t is maximized
for each set of constraints S=, S< and S>.D e ￿ne for ω ∈ {=,>,<} the highest pro￿t Πω(τ) that is
reached in constraint set Sω if the transmission price is τ:
Πω(τ)= m a x
p1,p2,xπ(p1,p 2,x) (39)
s.t. (p1,p 2,x) ∈ Sω (40)
p1 − p2 = τ (41)
Three such functions are sketched in ￿gure 6. As the constraint set S= is less strict than S< and
S>, the pro￿t function Π= lies above Π< and Π>. The validity of constraint set Sω depends on the
transmission price τ.(See equation 35) The true constraint set is S(p1,p 2).
De￿ne Π(r) as the maximum pro￿t that can be reached in the constraint set S(p1,p 2) for a trans-
mission price τ
Π(τ)= m a x
p1,p2,xπ(p1,p 2,x) (42)
s.t. (p1,p 2,x) ∈ S(p1,p 2) (43)
p1 − p2 = τ (44)
Given the de￿ntions above, this can be written as:
Π(τ)=

   
   
Π>(τ) τ > 0
Π=(τ) τ =0











Figure 6: Maximal pro￿t Π(τ) for a given transmission price τ.
which is presented by the thick line in ￿gure 6.
The monopolist chooses the transmission price τU that maximizes pro￿t.
τU =a r gm a x
τ Π(τ) (46)
The function Π(τ) is discontinuous and can have several local optima. The shape of Π(τ) is determined
by the location of τ> and τ<, which are the maximizers of Π>(τ) and Π<(τ).
τω =a r gm a x
τ Πω(τ) ω ∈ {<,>} (47)
See ￿gure 7.
Given that τ> < τ< (see later), there are three possibilities for the location of τ< and τ>:
case 1 :0< τ> < τ> (48)
case 2 : τ> < 0 < τ> (49)
case 3 : τ> < τ> < 0 (50)
For each case, the local optima of Π(τ) are indicated in Figure 7. If the local optimum is unique (case 2)
it is the global optimum. If there are several local optima (case 1 and case 3), they need to be calculated
and compared explicitly. In case 1, τ> and τ =0 , need to be compared, in case 2, τ< and τ =0 .
The remaining of the section derives the three possible local optima of Π(τ): τ =0 , τ = τ> and
τ = τ<. The last subsection illustrates the results numerically.
4.2 Uniform price in the regions (S=)
The monopolist sets a uniform price p in both regions. Assume that at the optimal price, both regions




















Figure 7: Local optima of Π(τ).
in the other market is positive:
pm
2H < ﬂ p1 and pm
1L < ﬂ p2 (51)
The monopolist uses an amount x of the transmission capacity at a zero price. His problem is:
(p=,x =) = argmax
p,x π1(p,cH)+π2(p,cL)+x • ∆c (52)
subject to the transmission constraint and the generation constraint in region 110:
x ≤ k (53)
h1(p) − x ≥ 0 (54)





They are the optimal uniform prices when the opportunity costs in region 1 and 2 are (cH,c L)a n d
(cL,c L). Using demand elasticities these prices can also be written as:

















2(p) the relative production increase.
The optimal price p= is
p= =

   
   
ptotL if pk
1 <p totL Case A
pk
1 if ptotL ≤ pk
1 ≤ ptotH Case B
ptotH if ptotH <p k
1 Case C
(57)
10Due to the assumptions made above, the consumption constraint in region 2 is not binding.
14For low transmission capacities (case C), the opportunity cost in region 1 is cH. Electricity is produced
in both regions. For large transmission capacities (case A), the opportunity cost of electricity in region
1 is cL. Electricity is only produced in the low cost country, the transmission capacity is not fully used.
For intermediate transmission capacities (Case B), opportunity cost in region 1 is between cH and cL
electricity is only produced in the low cost country, and the line is used at its capacity.
4.3 Trade from low to high cost region (S>)
In constraint set S> all transmission capacity is used from region 2 to region 1: x> = k. The monopolist
solves the following problem:
(p>
1 ,p >
2 ) = argmax
p1,p2
π1(p1,c H)+π2(p2,c L)+k • (∆c − τ) (58)
subject to the generation and consumption constraints
k ≤ h1(p1) (59)
0 ≤ h2(p2) (60)
The objective function of the monopolist depends on p1 and p2. If the monopolist changes the price
p1, it has an in￿uence on local pro￿ti nr e g i o n1, π1(p1,c H) and on the transmission cost k τ.












p {πi(p,cj) − kp} (62)
which can be interpreted as the prices set by a monopolist with ￿nancial obligations. p
+
ij is optimal for
a monopolist with production cost cj in market i, who has a long position on the price pi i.e. he sold
k forward contracts on the price pi.T h ep r i c ep
−
ij is optimal when he has a short position, i.e. he bought
forward contracts.






ij. For positive transmission capacities, p
+






































In region 2, the opportunity cost of electricity is cL. The optimal price in region 2 is p
+
2L as long as
it is lower than the reservation price in market 2.
p>
2 =m i n ( p
+
2L, ﬂ p2) (66)
15The price in region 1 is p
−
1H as long as demand in region 1 is larger than the transmission capacity.
p>




The monopolist can not set a price in region 1 above pk
1. Otherwise demand in region 1 would be smaller
than the transmission capacity k. There would be no congestion, and the price diﬀerence between the
regions would become zero.
If the price in region 1 is equal to p
−
1H, the opportunity cost in region 1 is equal to cH. Electricity
is produced in both regions.
If the price in region 1 is equal to pk
1, there is no production in region 1. The price is kept low in
order to keep the transmission line congested. The opportunity cost of electricity is lower than cH.
Note that if pk
1 <p
−
1L, the opportunity cost in region 1 is lower than cL.E v e n i f t h e r e w o u l d b e








does not have be monotonic in transmission capacity i.e. if the transmission capacity increases, the price




4.4 Trade from high to low cost region (S<)
The solution for constraint set S< is very similar to constraint set S>. Electricity is transported from
the high cost region to the low cost region (x< = −k), the optimal prices in region 1 and 2 are
p<





1 =m i n (ﬂ p1,p
+
1H) (69)
The price in region 1 is set according to a high opportunity cost (= cH)a sl o n ga st h ep r i c ei sb e l o w
the reservation price in region 1.I nr e g i o n2 the price of electricity is p
−
2L, unless the transmission line
is not congested at this price. The price is than lowered to pk
2. In this case, the opportunity cost of
electricity is lower than cL.
4.5 Numerical illustration
Consider the two examples discussed before. Figures 8 and 9 show the optimal prices under unbundling.
To simplify a comparison, the optimal prices under integration are drawn as well.
Example 1 (Figure 8)
If the transmission capacity is equal to zero, the monopolist sets the local monopoly price in both
regions pM
1H and pM
1L. The price in the high cost region is above the price in the low cost region. Prices
under integration and unbundling are the same. For low transmission capacities the monopolist sets the
prices p>
1 and p>
2 . If the transmission capacity increases, price diﬀerentiation becomes more and more
costly. The price diﬀerence gradually decreases until prices become equal (around 5500 MW). From that
point on, a uniform price p= is set for both regions. For transmission capacities below 7000 MW, the
prices is ptotH =4 6 .5 EUR/MWh , as the opportunity cost in region 1 is cH. For capacities between
7000 MW and 8000 MW, the price in equal to pk
1. The opportunity cost in region 1 is between cH and














Figure 8: Example 1: prices in both regions
cL. For capacities above 8000 MW the monopolist sets ptotL =4 2 EUR/MWh. The opportunity cost
in region one is cL.
Example 2 (Figure 9)
For zero transmission capacity, the monopolist sets the same prices under unbundling as under
integration. (pM
1H and pM
2L). The monopolist sets a higher price in region 2 than in region 1.F o r l o w
transmission capacities the monopolists sets p<
1 and p<
2 . The price diﬀerence decreases with transmission
capacity. Setting a higher price in the low cost region than in the high cost region is costly for the
monopolist: he has to pay for the transmission capacity, and he has to transport electricity from the
high cost region to the low cost. At a transmission capacity around 600 MW the monopolist switches
strategy. He does no longer price discriminate, but charges a uniform price (p=)i nb o t hr e g i o n s .H ed o e s
no longer pay for transmission capacity (gain = (p2−p1) k) and produces electricity more eﬃciently (gain
= 2 ∆ck ), but looses the pro￿t of price discrimination. For capacities below 3000 MW, the opportunity
cost in region 1 is cH. The uniform price is ptotH =5 2 EUR/MWh. For capacities between 3000 MW
and 4000 MW, the price is pk
1. And for capacities above 4000MW the opportunity cost is cL and the
uniform price is ptotL =4 9 EUR/MWh..
5 Comparison of unbundling and integration
This section compares integration (index I) and unbundling (index U). De￿ne the resulting level of
welfare V under regime l = U,I as
V l(k)=W(pl
1(k),p l
2(k),x l(k)) l = I,U (70)
with pl
i(k) the price in region i and xl(k) the transport of electricity that are optimal for the monopolist
under regime l.N o t et h a tw e l f a r eW is equal to gross consumer surplus minus generation costs. It can
























Figure 10: Welfare under integration and unbundling for small transmission capacities.
be rewritten as the sum of consumer surplus, monopoly pro￿t, and revenue for the auctioneer of the
transmission rights.
5.1 Small transmission capacity





2L. Welfare is equal under both regimes and zero transmission
capacities V U(0) = V I(0). For transmission capacities close to zero welfare can be approximated as
V l(ε)=V I(0) + ε • dV I
dk (0). Integration is better than unbundling when dV I
dk (0) > dV U
dk (0),a ss k e t c h e d
in Figure 10.



























The last term is the gain in production eﬃciency. The ￿rst two terms re￿ect the eﬀect on local surplus
in each market, given the local production cost. If the sum of the ￿rst two terms is negative at k =0 ,
welfare is higher under integration than under unbundling.
5.2 Large transmission capacity
For large transmission capacities the comparison of integration and unbundling becomes that of third
degree price discrimination and uniform pricing. See for instance Tirole, 1988. There are two reasons
for this:
(1) Under unbundling, arbitrage makes the transmission price equal to zero (τ =0 ). A uniform price
is charged in both regions.
( 2 )C o s td i ﬀerences do not matter: given the costless and unconstrained transmission, all electricity
is produced in the low cost region at a cost cL .
To my knowledge, no general conditions for the comparison of unbundling and integration exist.
5.3 Linear demand
As a special case, consider linear demand functions of the form hi(p)=αi − βip.D e ￿ne: χ = α1
β1 − α2
β2.
It is measure of the diﬀerence of the demand functions.





under integration, and pU
1 = pU
2 = ptotL under unbundling.
See appendix B.
Theorem 3 For suﬃciently large transmission capacities, unbundling is better than integration.
The monopolist￿s strategy is given by the previous lemma. It can be shown that total production
h is equal under integration and unbundling




11This assumes that the opportunity cost in region 1 is cH. As a result, region one￿s price does not change.
12This can be calculated as dV U
dk = Wp1 dpU
1
dk + Wp2 dpU
2
dk + Wx dxI
dk . The derivation assumes that the transmission
constraint is binding, and that the production and consumption constraints are not binding. This is the case for small
transmission capacities. Further it assumes that the price in region 1 is higher than in region 2.





The opportunity cost for electricity is cL in both regions.
Equation 18 rewrites for linear demand functions as:







with τI = 1




2 )−1. Unbundling is clearly better than integration.













Theorem 5 If demand functions are similar (−∆c<χ < ∆c), integration is better than unbundling
for small transmission capacities.
The previous lemma gives the monopolist￿s strategy for low transmission capacities. It can be shown
that the total production h is equal under unbundling and integration:




The transmission line is congested, the total quantity transported is equal to the available transmis-
sion capacity:
xU(k)=xI(k)=k (78)
As h and x are equal under both regimes, the welfare diﬀerence depends only on the price diﬀerence
τ and by integrating equation 13
WI − WU =
Z τI
τU







with τU = 1
2
‡
χ + ∆c − 1
ρk
·
and τI = 1
2(χ + ∆c). For small k, integration is better than unbundling
when χ < ∆c.
5.3.1 Intuition
For large transmission capacities, the opportunity costs for electricity is the same in both regions.
Welfare optimality requires that the price diﬀerence between the regions is zero. This is achieved by
unbundling.
For small transmission capacities, the regions have a diﬀerent opportunity cost for electricity. Welfare
optimality requires that the price diﬀerence equals the cost diﬀerence. If the demand functions are
similar, the monopolist sets a price diﬀerence is that is smaller than the cost diﬀerence.13 Unbundling
reduces the price diﬀerence and is thus welfare decreasing.












































































Figure 11: Example 1: Consumer surplus, monopolist￿s pro￿t, and total welfare in both regimes.
5.4 Numerical illustration
Figures 11 and 13 present, as function of the transmission capacity, consumers surplus in both regions,
monopoly pro￿t and welfare. For the ￿gures on the top there is unbundling. For the ￿gures on the
bottom, there is integration. In order to compare both regimes, ￿gures 12 and 14 show the diﬀerence in
consumer surplus, monopoly pro￿t and welfare under both regimes.
Example 1 (Figure 12)
For transmission capacities smaller than 8000 MW welfare is higher under integration. The monop-
olist always prefers integration, while the consumers like unbundling for capacities between 3000 and
5200 MW and above 8000 MW.
Example 2 (Figure 14).
For transmission capacities below 600 MW, welfare is higher under integration than under un-
bundling. The monopolist never likes unbundling as he has less strict constraints. Consumers always
prefer unbundling.
6 Extensions and Discussions
This section covers four topics related with policy problems. The ￿rst subsection uses the model with
linear demand and small transmission capacities and assumes that one of the markets is perfectly compet-
itive. The second subsection checks what the model in this paper can tell about the size of transmission
line. The third subsection shows that a centralized pool system and an unbundled transmission rights
market are equivalent. The fourth subsection extends the model and allows the monopolist to withhold
transmission capacity.









































































































Figure 13: Example 2: Consumer surplus, monopolist￿s pro￿t, network and total welfare in both regimes.





















Figure 14: Example 2: Comparison of integration and unbundling.
6.1 Perfect competition in one market
This subsection looks at the impact of the competitiveness of the markets on the choice of the allocation
mechanism for low transmission capacities. Suppose that a lot of competitive fringe generators enter
one of the regions. And assume that they have the same production cost as the monopolist. Their entry
will make the residual demand function for the monopolist perfectly elastic. As the competitive fringe
generators all produce at their marginal costs, it does no longer matter whether the monopolist owns
production capacity in that region or not.
First, assume perfect competition in the low cost region 2. The residual demand function for the
monopolist is perfect elastic β2 →∞and the price in the low cost region is α2
β2 = cL. The price in the
high cost region 1 is always above cL. Unbundling gives an incentive to decrease the price diﬀerence
between the regions, and hence decreases the price in region 1, and is always optimal.
Second, assume perfect competition in the high cost region 1.( β1 →∞and α1
β1 → cH.)T h ep r i c ei n
region 2 is larger than cH if cL is large and the region 1 is not competitive. In this case unbundling gives
the incentive to decrease the price diﬀerence between the regions, which is welfare improving, but could
also lead to a ineﬃcient ￿ow of electricity opposite to the cost diﬀerence which is welfare decreasing.
The price in region 2 is below cH, if cL << cH and market 2 is rather competitive. Unbundling will
increase the price in region 2, which is not optimal.
Summarizing: access to a transmission line that connects a competitive low cost region should be
auctioned. If the line connects a competitive high cost region, auctioning can lead to a decrease in
welfare.
6.2 Transmission Capacity
Until know the transmission capacity was assumed ￿xed. The two examples show that welfare is in
general increasing in transmission capacity. As long as investment in transmission capacity is not too
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Figure 15: Example 1: marginal welfare eﬀect of transmission capacity under unbundling
expensive, new capacity should be build.
Figures 15 and 16 show the marginal welfare eﬀect of transmission capacity dV U
dk (k) under unbundling.
It is the social demand function for transmission capacity. The ￿gures show that it is not a nicely
downward sloping and continuous function, but has jumps, and is negative in some regions. As a result
it is diﬃcult to make general conclusions about the optimal size of the transmission line.
Both regimes (unbundling and integration) give diﬀerent incentives to build new transmission lines
by private investors and by the monopolist. A long run comparison should take these incentives into
account. This remains open for further research.
6.3 Centralized pool
Another mechanism for the allocation of transmission capacity than an auction, is a centralized (pool)
system (Schweppe et al., 1988). Generators and consumers submit bids to the network operator for
the production and consumption of electricity. The network operator solves an optimization problem,
and sets quantities and prices of production and consumption. In this process transmission capacity
is allocated implicitly. The centralized market yields identical prices, pro￿ts and total sales as the
decentralized market when there is perfect arbitrage, equilibrium in the transmission market and no
withholding of transmission capacity. Note that the sales in a region can be diﬀerent. These results are
generally valid under perfect competition (Boucher and Smeers, in press), Cournot competition (Metzler
et al. in press) and conjectured supply functions (Day et al., 2001).
The reason for this equivalence result is that the monopolist is indiﬀerent in transporting electricity
himself, or allowing the network operator to transport electricity. The reasoning is similar as in equation
32.
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Figure 16: Example 2: marginal welfare eﬀect of transmission capacity under unbundling
6.4 Withholding
This subsection introduces the possibility of withholding. By buying transmission capacity and not
using it, the monopolist is able to reduce the quantity that is eﬀectively transported over the network,
without decongestioning the transmission line. This section does not derive a full set of solutions, but
highlights when withholding will occur.
The monopolist withholds a fraction (1−γ) of the transmission rights that are sold, x. He maximizes
pro￿t:
max
p1,p2,x,γ π1(p1 − cH)+π2(p2 − cL)+x(γ∆c − τ)
subject to the arbitrage condition (27), the transmission market equilibrium (28-30) and
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (80)
max{γx,0} ≤ h1(p1) (81)
max{−γx,0} ≤ h2(p2) (82)
The last two constraints are generation and consumption constraints in region 1 and 2. If the generator
sets γ =1 , he does not withhold transmission capacity. The problem reduces to the one discussed in
the previous sections.
This optimization problem can be solved by looking at the three constraint sets valid for τ =0 ,
τ > 0 and τ < 0.
For prices τ =0 , the problem is identical to the one already solved. Withholding has no eﬀect, as
transmission price is equal to zero.
A positive transmission price implies that x = k. Withholding of transmission capacity increases
production costs, as less electricity is transported from the cheap region to the expensive region. But
it relaxes the consumption constraint in region 1. Without withholding, the opportunity cost in region
251 c o u l dd r o pb e l o wcL (See the discussion above). This was the case if pk
1 <p
−
1L. The monopolist kept
prices up in order to keep the line congested. In this case, if withholding is allowed, the monopolist
can set a price p
−
1L in region 1,i m p o r th1(p
−
1L), and withhold capacity to keep the line congested:
(1 − γ)k = h1(p
−
1L).
A lower price in region 1 than in region 2 (price region III), implies that x = −k. The generator
withholds all transmission capacity (γ =0 ). It increases production eﬃciency and relaxes the consump-
tion constraint in region 2. Withholding allows production cost to decrease with x ∆c.T h er e l a x a t i o n
of the consumption constraint in region 2 allows the monopolist to set a price p
−
2L in region 1 even if
consumption in region 2 is smaller than the transmission capacity: h2(p
−
2L) <k .
Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that a monopolist can withhold transmission capacity in order to
extract some of the inframarginal rents of a low cost fringe generator. Such behavior can lead to
ineﬃcient restricting the imports from a low cost region. This is very similar to the result found here:
the monopolist will withhold capacity in order to increase the price diﬀerence, i.e. extract more rents
of the consumers in the high price region.
Only in the second numerical example withholding occurs. Figure 17 gives the optimal price un-
der unbundling when withholding is allowed (index W), and when not (index U). Withholding makes
price discrimination cheaper for the monopolist, therefore he discriminates up to higher transmission
capacities. For larger transmission capacities, a uniform price is set, unbundling with and without
withholding give the same results. Figure 18 compares welfare under unbundling with and without
unbundling and integration. For transmission capacities below 590 MW, WI >WW >WU. For trans-
mission capacities between 590 MW and 890 MW WU >W I >W W. And for capacities above 890
MW :WU = WW >WI.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper considers a monopolist who supplies a homogenous product to two geographically separated
markets. Production costs and demand conditions are diﬀerent in each market. A line with a limited
transport capacity connects both markets. The paper derives the equilibrium strategy for the monopolist
under two regimes for the use of the line: unbundling and integration.
As a special case, it considers linear demand functions. It shows that for low transmission capacities,
diﬀerent costs and similar demand conditions, integration gives a higher welfare than unbundling. For
large transmission capacities, unbundling is always better.
The intuition for small transmission capacities is as follows. Welfare is determined by (1) total pro-
duction quantity, (2) the allocation of production among consumers, and (3) the transport of electricity.
For small transmission capacities and linear demand, only the second term is important to compare
integration and unbundling. Allocational eﬃciency requires that the price diﬀerence is equal to the cost
diﬀerence. Imperfect arbitrage makes price diﬀerentiation costly, and gives an incentive to the monopo-
list to decrease the price diﬀerence between the regions. This is welfare decreasing if the price diﬀerence
was already smaller than the cost diﬀerence.
The last part of the paper shows that there are two reasons why a monopolist would withhold





















Figure 17: Optimal prices under unbundling with withholding (index W) and without (index U).



















Figure 18: Comparison of welfare under unbundling with withholding (W) without (U) and integration (I).
Integration is taken as the reference.
27transmission capacity, i.e. buying transmission capacity and not using it. First, it makes it possible
to set a high price in the importing region without de-congestioning the transmission line. Second, it
makes it cheaper to congest a line in the opposite direction of cost diﬀerences, i.e. congestion from the
cheap region to the expensive region.
The policy implications could be summarized as follows:
￿ If a transmission line is small and production costs are diﬀerent between two regions, it is sometimes
better to let the monopolist manage the transmission line.
￿ If transmission capacity is suﬃciently large, auctioning of transmission is optimal. (linear demand
functions.)
￿ A transmission lines that starts in a competitive low cost region should always be auctioned.
￿ Withholding transmission capacity can have positive and negative welfare eﬀects.
The model made assumptions like perfect arbitrage in the transmission market, a one-link network,
a single generator, and a strict transmission limit:
The model compares two extreme assumptions: perfect arbitrage and no arbitrage at all. In practice,
the creation of a transmission market, does not always lead to perfect arbitrage.14 Possible reasons
could include that the electricity markets are not cleared at the same moment in time, the existence of
asymmetric information, lack of liquidity in the electricity and the transmission markets. It is not clear
how this aspects can be incorporated in the model. Joskow and Tirole look at non-competitive supply
of transmission rights by several auctioneers. 15
Extensions of the model to a more complex network are cumbersome, given the non-linear constraints
in the optimization problem for the monopolist.
Extending the model from a monopoly to an oligopoly model requires an extra assumption on the
variables that are set by the generators: quantities, supply functions, etc.. Two regimes can be compared:
one with regional arbitrage and one without. See for instance Day et al 2002.
The paper assumes strict capacity limits for the transmission line, which is valid in the short run.
This gives the supply function of transmission as in ￿gure 5. In the long run, transmission capacity is
not ￿xed. This can be incorporated in the model by assuming a ￿atter supply function. This remains
for further research.
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A Uniqueness of the solution
This appendix discusses the uniqueness of the strategy of the monopolist .I no r d e rt od os o ,t h ed e c i s i o n
variables of the monopolist are taken to be quantities.
A.1 Integration
The problem of the monopolist can be written in production quantities Q1,Q 2, consumption quantities
q1,q 2 and transmission quantity x:
max
qi,Qi,x
πI(q1,q 2,Q 1,Q 2)=q1 p1(q1) − Q1cH + q2 p2(q2) − Q2cL
29subject to
x = q1 − Q1
x = Q2 − q2
−k ≤ x ≤ k
0 ≤ qi
0 ≤ Qi
When hi() is decreasing and concave as assumed in the text, the objective function πI(q1,q 2,Q 1,Q 2) is
concave. The constraints form a convex, but unbounded set. The set is unbounded as local production
and consumption can be increased simultaneously without violating any constraint. In order for a unique
solution to exist, the marginal revenue of increasing local consumption, should be lower than the local
production costs for large consumption quantities.
lim
q1→∞ p0
1(q1)q1 + p1(q1) ≤ cH
lim
q2→∞ p0
2(q2)q2 + p2(q2) ≤ cL
A.2 Unbundling
This section studies the uniqueness of (p>
1 ,p >
2 ,x >). It is the maximum of the pro￿t function in the
constraint set S>. The monopolist￿s problem is transformed in quantities and becomes:
max
q1,q2
(p1(q1) − cH) • (q1 − k)+( p2(q2) − cL) • (q2 + k) (83)
subject to
q1 ≥ k (z1) (84)
q2 ≥ 0( z2) (85)
The objective function is concave when
p00
1(q1)(q1 − k)+2 p0
1(q1) < 0 (86)
Given the constraint q1 ≥ k this is always the case.
The constraints form an unbounded convex set. In order for a solution to exist, the following
conditions should be satis￿ed:
lim
q1→∞ p0
1(q1)( q1 − k)+p1(q1) <c H (87)
lim
q2→∞ p0
2(q2)( q2 + k)+p2(q2) <c L (88)
A.3 The supremum of Π>(τ)
De￿ne ￿ τ> as the supremum of Π>(τ) for positive τ:
￿ τ> =a r gs u p
τ
Π>(τ) s.t. τ > 0, (89)
30τ τ
> τ%
Figure 19: The supermum of the pro￿t function for positive transmission prices τ > 0.
Section 4.1 assumes that if τ> < 0, that the supremum lies at the boundary of the price region: ￿ τ> =0 .
See ￿gure 19.
This is not so obvious as it is not certain that Π>(•) is a concave function. In order to rewrite 89 in
quantities, the following constraint should be added to the optimization problem:
p1(q1) >p 2(q2) (90)
This condition is not convex in q1 and q2. However, as all other constraints are convex in q1 and q2,
and the objective function is concave, the supremum should be located on the boundary if τ> < 0.B u t ,
there can be multiple local suprema on the boundary p1(q1)=p2(q2).
B Linear demand functions





under integration, and pU
1 = pU
2 = ptotL under unbundling.
Take k>max{1









2p1(cL), the opportunity cost in region 1 is equal to the cL. (see equation 25)
Unbundling
If k>|ρ(χ + ∆c)|, the monopolist sets a uniform price in both regions: (π(p>
1 ,p >
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, the transmission constraint is not
binding (equation 57).













2h1(cH),h 2(cL),ρ(χ − ∆c)}
Integration:
If k<1




2L under integration. The condition
makes sure that the opportunity cost in region 1 is equal to cH. This follows directly from equation 25.
31Unbundling
For k<ρ(χ − ∆c), it is optimal to set a higher price in region 1 than in region 2. The conditions
k<h 1(cH) and k<h 2(cL) make sure that the production constrain in region 1 and the consumption
constraint in region 2 are not binding.
C Welfare function
The marginal eﬀects of welfare de￿ned by equation 6 are:
Wp1 = h0
1(p1)(p1 − cH) (91)
Wp2 = h0
2(p2)(p2 − cL) (92)
Wx = ∆c (93)
Rewriting the welfare W∗(h,τ,x) as function of total production h, the regional price diﬀerence τ,a n d







































∂p1 =1 ,a n d ∂τ
∂p2 = −1.
If no electricity is produced in region 1, x = h1(p1), and the objective function can be written as
function of p1 and p2:
￿ W(p1,p 2)=GCS1(p1)+GCS2(p2) − cL(h1(p1)+h2(p2)) (95)
The marginal welfare eﬀects are:
￿ Wp1 = h0
1(p1)(p1 − cL) (96)
￿ Wp2 = h0
1(p2)(p2 − cL) (97)
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